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COMMENTS

THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTION AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE MONTANA
STATE CONSTITUTION: "THEY MEAN SOMETHING"
Tammy Wyatt-Shaw*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 1975 the Montana Department of State Lands (DSL)
issued a hard rock gold mine operating permit to Golden Sunlight Mines,
Inc. (Golden Sunlight).' Since the mine's inception, DSL has amended
Golden Sunlight's operating permit eight times, effectively expanding the
mine with each amendment. The mine is currently permitted for operations through 2005.2
The mine will cumulatively produce 50 million tons of tailings, 300
million tons of waste rock, and a pit covering approximately 209 acres.,
The near-circular pit will be 2000 feet in diameter and contain a "lake"
approximately 52 acres in size and 225 feet deep.' The pit highwall will be
approximately 325 feet above the water level. 5 The water in the pit is
"expected to be of poor quality... (with) Ph levels close to 2.4 ... (and)

elevated metal contents particularly for cadmium, iron, copper, zinc, and
nickel, which exceed drinking water standards." DSL does not know
whether the pit water will leak from the pit into groundwater or nearby
surface waters, but Golden Sunlight has committed to treatment of pit
7

seepage.

* Theauthor wishes to thank Professor Larry M. Elison for his thoughts, theories, and ideas;The
Honorable Charles B. McNeill for his kindly reviewing this article: and Beth Brennan, Martha
Colhoun, and Stu Levit for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
I. DSL permit 00065 (on file with DSL, Helena, Mont.).
MONT. DEPT. OFSTATE LANDS & U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGENEr, GoLDENSuNuGHT
2.
MINING, INc., APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT (008) ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 4 (1990)(on file

with The Public Land Law Review) [hereinafter GSM EA].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 54.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. GSM EA, supra note 2, at 54, 125, Record of Decision and attached Stipulations.
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DSL amended Golden Sunlight's permit for the eighth time knowing
that meaningful pit reclamation would not take place.8 The Golden
Sunlight mine will become Montana's largest gold mine in terms of waste

rock handled and acres disturbed."
In March 1992, various environmental advocacy groups filed suit

against DSL and Golden Sunlight, opposing DSL's approval of Amendment 008.10 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, among other claims,

that DSL violated Article IX, sections 1(3) and 2(1) of the Montana State
Constitution in approving Amendment 008."1 DSL moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims on the basis that the provisions at issue
were not "self executing."' 2 The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge for
Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, denied

DSL's Motion.' 3

In construing Article IX, Judge Honzel referred to the "inalienable"
right of a clean and healthful environment found in the Montana
Constitution. " Judge Honzel wrote:
With respect to Count Five which alleges a violation of Article

IX, Section 2, [requiring that all lands disturbed by the taking of
natural resources shall be reclaimed] the case may not be as
strong to find an independent cause of action based on an alleged
failure to require reclamation of the lands disturbed. It seems to

the Court, however, that reclamation is directly tied to a clean
and healthful environment. Therefore, if the legislature has

8. The only pit reclamation considered in the GSM EA was reclamation of the benches, or talus
slopes, by using tree plantings on oxidized materials, or amended unoxidized materials. GSM EA,
supra note 2, at 122. The GSM EA further stated that reclamation of these pit benches was not feasible
because of material friability. Id. The GSM EA considered no highwall or steep slope reclamation.
9. GSM EA, supra note 2, at 1.
10. Complaint and Application for Alternative Writ of Mandate, National Wildlife Fed'n,
Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr., Mineral Policy Ctr., Gallatin Wildlife Ass'n, Sierra Club v.Montana Dep't
of State Lands, and Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., No. CDV 92-486 (D. Mont. filed Mar. 30, 1992).
11. Id. at 2. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1,provides that:
(1)
The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment
in Montana for present and future generations. ...
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
MONT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2, provides that:
(1)
All lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed. The legislature
shall provide effective requirements and standards for the reclamation of lands disturbed.
12. Montana Dep't of State Lands Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4, National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Montana Dep't of State Lands, No. CDV-92-486 (D. Mont. filed May 17, 1992).
13. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Montana Dep't of State Lands, No. CDV-92-486 (D. Mont. Dec.
11, 1992) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
14. "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a
clean and healthful environment ...... MONT. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
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failed to provide effective requirements and standards for reclamation, or if DSL, the agency in charge of the project, has
allowed the project to proceed without effective reclamation
requirements and standards, Plaintiffs should be able to pursue
their claim. The constitutionalprovisions at issue here are not
merely advisory. They mean something.15
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that DSL has
violated the self-executing provisions in Article IX by amending the
operating permit.' 6 This motion is pending.
This comment first explores the judicially developed constitutional
doctrine of "self-execution," and its historical interpretation by courts.
The comment will emphasize the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the doctrine.
Next, this comment will survey the interpretation of environmental
provisions in state constitutions, and the application of the self-execution
doctrine to those provisions. Third, the comment will posit a theory of selfexecution which better reflects the ideals of a constitutional democracy and
the role a constitition plays in that democracy. The comment finds that
Montana's constitutional protections are self-executing.
Finally, this comment discusses two potential problems that Montana's self-executing environmental provisions may create. First, the
comment will analyze who has standing to sue under these constitutional
provisions. Second, it will discuss what remedies currently are available to
aggrieved parties under the environmental provisions of the Montana State
Constitution, and what additional remedies, if any, the Montana Supreme
Court should fashion.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTION

A. Defining the Parametersof Self-Execution
Under the doctrine of self-execution, the judiciary should start with
the presumption that all constitutional provisions "mean something." 7
However, in the final analysis, not all constitutional provisions do "mean
something," and some mean more than others. To have substantive,
enforceable meaning, a constitutional provision must be "self-executing."
If a constitutional provision is not self-executing, the provision has no more
15. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Montana Dep't of State Lands. No. CDV-92-486 (D. Mont. Dec.
11, 1992) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss) (emphasis added).
16. Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 15-16, National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Montana Dep't of State Lands, No. CDV-92-486 (D. Mont. filed Oct. 8. 1993).
17. Fenton v. Groveland Community Serv. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758.762 (1982); 16 Am. Jur. 2d
ConstitutionalLaw § 142 (1979).
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than moral force.'
A constitutional provision is "self-executing" if the judiciary can
enforce the provision without the aid of a legislative enactment.1" Generally, a court will follow one of three approaches in determining whether a
provision is self-executing: (1) Professor and Judge Thomas J. Cooley's
articulation of the doctrine; (2) the original intent of the constitutional
drafters; and (3) bright-line classification of constitutional provisions into
self-executing and non-self-executing categories according to the language
employed.
Historically, courts have followed Professor Thomas J. Cooley's
theory of self-execution. 20 According to Professor Cooley, to be immediately enforceable, the constitutional provision must supply the judiciary
with a
rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and
protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and [the
provision] is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.2
Professor Cooley argues that if a constitutional provision merely sets forth
principles, it has no effect until the legislature enacts supplemental
legislation.2" Moreover, the judiciary cannot order the legislature to enact
the requisite legislation; the "right intended to be given is only assured
when the legislation is voluntarily enacted." 2 3 In other words, rights
contained in provisions which are not self-executing lie dormant until a
statute implements the right. 4
If the constitution directs the legislature to implement a policy or
principle, the constitutional directive has "only a moral force" until the
legislature acts.2 5 In the case of a provision which is not self-executing,
Professor Cooley acknowledges that under his theory an unjust law, or law
inconsistent with a constitutional provision, remains enforceable until the
legislature chooses to repeal the law. 28 This is true even if the purpose of the

18.

County of Erie v. City of Erie, 6 A. 136, 137 (Pa. 1886); THOMAS J. COOLEY, I COOLEY's
165 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927).
19. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1360(6th ed. 1990); 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 46 (1984).
20. See, e.g, Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399,403 (1900); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 591 (Pa. 1973).
21. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 167-68.
22. Id. at 165;see, e.g., Butte Community Unionv. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Mont. 1987).
23. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 165; see, e.g., Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v.
Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972).
24. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 169; see, e.g., Spinney v. Griffith, 32 P. 974, 975 (Cal. 1893).
25. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 165.
26. "[Constitutional provisions] do not displace the law previously in force, though the purpose
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
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constitutional enactment was to displace current law.2"
Professor Cooley qualifies his theory by noting that a constitutional
provision does not lose its self-executing character simply because the
provision mandates that the legislature shall enact implementing legislation.28 "[T]he mere fact that legislation might supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing provision does not
render such provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation." 29
Cooley uses the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
an example.30
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that the right to vote shall not be
denied on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.3 1 The
amendment also gives Congress the power to enforce it with appropriate
legislation.3 2 In this case, Professor Cooley argues that the amendment
immediately abolishes all distinctions in suffrage based on race, color, and
servitude.3 3 Professor Cooley reasons that the legislative directive in the
second part of the provision does not alter the self-executing character of
the first provision.3 4 Professor Cooley argues that the legislative directive is
simply a recognition by the constitutional drafters that the constitutional
rule may be insufficient to comprehensively protect the right to its fullest
extent. 35 In other words, a provision is self-executing "so far as it is
susceptible of execution."36

In Davis v. Burke, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Professor Cooley's
articulation of the self-execution doctrine.3 7 In that case, the Court
examined a provision contained in the Idaho Constitution.3 8 However, in
expounding on Professor Cooley's rule, the Court articulated a more
generous interpretation of the self-execution doctrine. The Court agreed
that when a constitutional provision only "lays down general principles,"3' 9
implementing legislation may be needed. The Court seems to quietly part
may be manifest to do away with it by the legislation required." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 170.
29. Id. at 170;see, e.g., General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859. 862 (Mont. 1975).
30. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 166.
31. U.S. CONST. amend XV.
32. Id.
33. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 166.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Davis, 179 U.S. at 403.
37. 179 U.S. at 403.
38. "No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on
presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after a
commitment by a magistrate .... "IDAHO CONsr. art. 1. § 8.
39. Davis, 179 U.S. at 403.
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company with Professor Cooley regarding "certain" rights and "certain
principles of law and procedure.

40

But where a constitution asserts a certain right, or lays down a
certain principle of law or procedure, it speaks for the entire
people as their supreme law, and is full authority for all that is
done in pursuance of its provision .... For us to say that the
accused had been denied due process of law would involve the
absurdity of holding that what the people had declared to be the
law was not the law41
The Court's plain language provides persuasive authority that rights
do not "lie dormant" until the legislature acts.4 2 Nevertheless, courts
continually cite Professor Cooley and Davis in tandem, but apply the
stricter Cooley interpretation.4 3
A second approach to determining whether a constitutional provision
is self-executing is to examine the intent of the constitutional drafters. In
Student Government Ass'n of Louisiana State University v. Board of
Supervisors of LouisianaState University,44 the majority concluded that
the essence of Professor Cooley's articulation is essentially one of intent. 5
Thus, a provision is immediately enforceable without legislation if the
judiciary's failure to enforce the provision would frustrate the intent of the
drafters. 6
Under the facts of that case, the court construed as self-executing the
constitutional mandate that the University "shall be under the direction,
control, supervision and management" of its Board of Supervisors.4 7 The
majority concluded that the drafters' intent was "to remove the administration of the daily affairs of the University from both the Governor and
Legislature and place them under a nonpolitical board. ' 48 Therefore, any
legislation that interfered with the board's autonomy must be held
49
unconstitutional given the drafters' intent.
The dissent framed the issue of intent more narrowly. Intent should be
"ascertained from the language used, the object to be accomplished, and
40.

Id. The court appears to use "certain" in the sense of "fixed, settled or stated." WEnSTER'S
367 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1961).
41. Id. at 403-04.
42. COOLEY, supra note 18, at 169; Spinney, 32 P. at 975.
43. See. e.g., National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 591.
44. 264 So. 2d 916 (La. 1972).
45. Student Gov't Ass'n of LSU, 246 So. 2d at 919.
46. "[lf the purposes of the constitutional will be enactment frustrated unless immediately
effective without legislation, it may be regarded as 'self-executing.' The ultimate question, actually, is
one of constitutional intent ....
" Id.
47. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
48. Student Gov't Ass'n of LSU, 246 So. 2d at 919.
49. Id. at 920.
THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY
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the surrounding circumstances. ' 50 According to the dissent, the drafters'
"object to be accomplished," or purpose, did not include the creation of "a
separate unit of government free of all interference from the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches." 51 The dissent's interpretation of intent is
frequently cited. 52
Finally, commentators attempt to isolate and establish the bright-line
rules courts use in determining whether a constitutional provision is selfexecuting. 53 Such attempts focus on a constitutional provision's character
and the language employed. This doctrinal approach classifies constitutional provisions as non-mandatory, mandatory, non-prohibitory, and
prohibitory. 54 A single constitutional provision may contain combinations
of each type, complicating the classification process. 5
Non-mandatory provisions do not direct the legislature, impose a duty
or obligation, or grant a right.56 These provisions are often statements of
public policy, or sentiment. 57 For example, "The people declare that
Montana servicemen, servicewomen, and veterans may be given special
considerations determined by the legislature" is a statement of public
policy.5 8 These provisions universally fail the self-execution test."9 Thus,
they have no more than moral force.
In contrast, mandatory provisions direct the legislature, grant a right,
or impose a duty. 0 For example, "The people shall have the right
peaceably to assemble, petition for redress or peaceably protest governmental action,"'" or "The state and each person shall maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations." 62 Whether a mandatory provision is self-executing
depends on whether it is prohibitory or non-prohibitory. 3
Mandatory-prohibitory provisions present an easy case. These provisions generally prohibit certain legislative acts. Examples from the
Montana Constitution include such provisions as "The state shall make no
50.

Id. at 922.

51.

Id. at 923.

52. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law Sec. 46 (1984).
53. See generally Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions. Environmental Rights Provisions.
and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A PoliticalQuestion?, 17 HARV. E.vTL. L. REv. 333 (1993).
54. See id. at 341-42; 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw §§ 46-47, 52 (1984).
55. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 351-53.
56. Id. at 342.

57. Id.
58. MONT. CoNsT. art. I1, § 35.
59. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 46 (1984). "'Constitutional provisions are not self-executing
if they merely indicate a line of policy or principles .... - Id.
60. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 342.
61. MONT. CONsT. art. 1, § 6.
62. MONT. CoNsr. art. IX, § 1, cl. 1.
63. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 343-53.
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law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,"6 or "No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies .... "65 Any

legislation which is contrary to the principle contained in a mandatoryprohibitory provision may be struck down as unconstitutional. 6
Mandatory-nonprohibitory provisions present the most difficulty to
courts. These provisions often direct the legislature to do something, but

fail to prohibit certain legislative acts. For example, "The legislature shall
provide for a Department of Agriculture and enact laws and provide
appropriations to protect, enhance, and develop agriculture." 67 When

faced with such a provision, courts refrain from enforcing the principle
contained in the provision, i.e., protect, enhance and develop agriculture,
and, moreover, refuse to direct the legislature to do so, despite the clear
constitutional directive.68 This judicial restraint is premised upon preserving the separation of powers. 69

Further, a mandatory-nonprohibitory provision may purport to grant
a right. For example, "All persons are born free and have certain
inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment. ... "0 In such instances, courts may construe the provision as
self-executing. 7 ' Generally, these provisions are construed as being "complete but for the lack of a remedy. '72 Therefore, the court may establish an
73
appropriate equitable or legal remedy, and enforce the right.
A more difficult scenario arises when a mandatory provision is

followed by a legislative directive, for example, the Montana Constitution's Article IX provisions.74 Courts seem to part company in their
64. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5.
65. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
66. State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 132 P.2d 689, 700 (Mont. 1942)
(quoting Wren v. Dixon, 161 P. 722, 729 (Nev. 1916)); Fernandez, supra note 53, at 350; 16 Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 146 (1979).
67. MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 1, cl. 1.
68. See, e.g., Montana Stockgrowers Ass'n v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 777 P.2d 285 (Mont.
1989).
69. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 269 So. 2d at 686.
70. MONT. CONST. art 11, § 3.
71. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 353; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 48 (1984). "Constitutional provisions designed to guarantee or safeguard individual rights may be self-executing, as, for
example, provisions of a negative or prohibitive character forbidding violations of individual rights."
id.
72. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 353.
73. Id. at 354.
74. "The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment...
The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty .... MONT. CONST.
art. IX, § 1, cl. 1-2.
"All lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed. The legislature shall
provide effective requirements and standards for the reclamation of lands disturbed." MONT. CONST.
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interpretations of such provisions.75 Some courts hold that until the
legislature acts, any right purportedly granted is "naked," like the "earth
before creation." ' 6 Other courts hold that the legislative directive is only
intended to supplement the right, or aid enforcement of a duty."
2. Application of "self-executing" in Montana
No clear test of self-execution emerges from Montana decisions. The
Montana Supreme Court has, at times, gleaned portions from each of the
theories discussed above.7 8 The most lengthy and detailed discussion of the
doctrine is found in State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre
79
Corp.
In that case, the court examined a provision contained in 1889
Montana Constitution. ° The court recited a "fundamental test" of selfexecution which appears to synthesize the three self-execution theories. 81
The court first explained that "prohibitory provisions in a constitution are
usually self-executing to the extent that anything done in violation of them
is void."" 2 Next, the court decided whether the language used in the
provision is addressed to the legislature or the court. as If the provision is
addressed to the court, the court next examined the "language used" and
the "intrinsic nature of the provision itself" 8 ' to determine whether "the
extent of the right conferred and to the liability imposed" can be
determined from the provision itself.8 5
Other Montana cases apply a single approach more directly. For
example, in a recent case construing the right-to-know provision of the
Montana Constitution, 8 the court simply concluded from the plain
art. IX, § 2, cl. 1.

75. Fernandez, supra note 53, at 343-49.
76. Spinney, 32 P. at 975; see also Fernandez, supra note 53, 345-46.
77.

GeneralAgriculture Corp., 534 P.2d at 862 (quoting 16 CJS. ConstitutionalLaw § 48).

78. See supra notes 20-77 and accompanying text.
79.

132 P.2d 689.

80. "The legislative assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries, or gift enterprises for
any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this state."
MoNr. CoNsT. art. 'XIX, § 2 (1889).
81. Fox-GreatFalls Theatre, 132 P.2d at 700; see supra notes 20-77 and accompanying text.
82. Fox-GreatFalls Theatre, 132 P.2d at 700 (quoting Wren v. Dixon, 161 P. 722. 729 (Nev.
1916)); see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
83.

Fox-Great Falls Theatre, 132 P.2d at 700.

84. Id. (quoting Broderick v.Weinsier, 293 N.Y.S. 889, 901(1937)); see supra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text.
85. Fox-Great Falls Theatre, 132 P.2d at 700 (quoting Broderick, 293 N.YS. at 901); see
supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
86. "No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases
which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." Mo.ir. Co.ST.
art. 11, § 9.
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language of the provision "that there was no intent on the part of the
87
drafters to require any legislative action in order to effectuate its terms."

The Montana Supreme Court has also indicated its willingness to consider
whether a provision is mandatory and prohibitory.8"

At least two Montana cases illustrate a departure from the harsh
interpretation and effects of these self-execution theories. In General
Agriculture Corp. v. Moore"9 the court construed a mandatory-nonprohib-

itory provision qualified by a legislative directive found in Article IX. 0 The
court reasoned that:
The fact that a right granted by a constitutional provision may be
better or further protected by supplementary legislation does not
of itself prevent the provision in question from being self-

executing; nor does the self-executing character of a constitutional provision necessarily preclude legislation for the better

protection of the right secured, or legislation in furtherance of the
purposes, or of the enforcement, of the provision.91

Further, the court recognized the supremacy of a constitution as fundamental law. 2 The court concluded that it could not rightfully ignore the
mandate of a sovereign people. 93

On one occasion, the Montana Supreme Court has observed and
enforced the principles contained in a constitutional provision although it
held the constitutional provision at issue was not self-executing. 4 In
construing Article XII, section 3, the welfare provision, 5 the court held
87. Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings, 780 P.2d J86, 188 (Mont. 1989); see also Helena
Elem. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). In Helena Elem., the court interpreted
article X, section 1, "Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the State."
MONT. CONST. art. X, § I, cl.
1.While not specifically addressing a self-execution question, the court
looked at the plain language of the provision and rejected the state's argument that the provision was
simply an aspirational goal. Helena Elem., 769 P.2d at 689. See generally Student Govn't Ass'n of
L.S.U., 264 So. 2d at 919.
88. Alexander v. State, 381 P.2d 780, 781 (Mont. 1963); Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 132
P.2d at 700.
89. 534 P.2d 859 (Mont. 1975).
90. "All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby
recognized and confirmed." MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3, cl.
1.
"The legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and regulation of water rights and
shall establish a system of centralized records, in addition to the present system of local records."
MONT. CoN s. art. IX, § 3, cl.
4.
91. GeneralAgriculture Corp., 534 P.2d at 862 (quoting 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 48).
92. Id.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 862-63.

Butte Community Union, 745 P.2d at 1130.
The court considered the following provision: "The legislature shall provide such economic

assistance and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by
reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have need for the aid of society." Id. at 1129 (quoting
MONT. CO NST. art. XII, § 3, cl.
3 (amended 1988)).
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that the provision was not self-executing, and that legislation was needed to
give the provision force.96
Pursuant to the constitution, the legislature enacted a statutory
scheme of general welfare assistance benefits. 97 However, the legislature
limited benefits to able-bodied persons without dependent children to two
months of nonmedical general relief assistance within a twelve-month
period." Defendant Social Rehabilitation Services argued that ablebodied persons without dependent minor children are not "misfortunate"
given the legislative definition of the constitutional term "misfortune." 99
The court reasoned that once the legislature chose to act, it could not
escape its constitutional duty to aid the "misfortunate" by "defining out"
persons to whom the constitutional protection applied. 00 The court
concluded that the constitution contemplated aid to all persons suffering
misfortune.101
Although the court held that the welfare provision was not selfexecuting, the court in its equal protection analysis concluded that the
welfare provision gave protected persons a sufficient interest in welfare
benefits that any legislative distinctions among protected individuals must
be reasonable.10 2 Moreover, the governmental interest in limiting welfare
benefits to certain individuals must be more important than the people's
interest in obtaining welfare benefits.103 Applying this heightened standard of scrutiny, the court found the enacted general welfare assistance
scheme unconstitutional.104

At least one other plaintiff has attempted to extend the holding in the
welfare case to other legislative directives in the Montana constitution. 05
In MontanaStockgrowers Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, the plaintiff
urged the court to review a tax classification scheme which taxed livestock,
but exempted business inventory, under a heightened level of scrutiny. 06
This welfare provision was amended on Nov. 8, 1988. The amended provision now provides that,
"[t]he legislature may provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those

who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in need."
MONT. CONsT. art. XII, § 3, cl. 3.
96. Butte Community Union, 745 P.2d at 1130.
97. Id. at 1129. This case involves the Montana Legislature's second attempt to enact general
assistance legislation which would pass constitutional muster. The Montana Supreme Court struck

down the first enactment in Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
98.

Butte Community Union, 745 P.2d at 1129.

99.

Id. at 1130.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1131 (following Butte Community Union v. Lewis. 712 P.2d at 1313).
103. Id.; Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d at 1314.
104. Butte Community Union. 745 P.2d at 1133.
105. Montana Stockgrowers Ass'n, 777 P.2d at 288.

106.

Id. at 288.

230
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Relying on Butte Community Union v. Lewis, the stockgrowers argued
that Article XII, section 1,107 expressed a constitutional principle to
protect, enhance and develop agriculture which possessed enough constitutional significance to give the stockgrowers a constitutionally protected

interest in agriculture. 10 8 Thus, the stockgrowers argued that any distinc0
tions between livestock and business inventory must be reasonable.0'

Further, the government's interests in taxing livestock while exempting
business inventory must be more important that the stockgrowers' interests
in developing and enhancing agriculture. 10
The court rejected the stockgrowers' argument, concluding that
Article XII, section 1, is simply a "broad directive whose specifics are

implemented through legislative decision, not constitutional mandate."

'

As such, the court reasoned that any distinctions need only be reasonable,

and bear a fair and substantial relationship to the legislative objective."'
Under this lower level of scrutiny, the court declared the tax scheme
constitutional."13 Thus, after Montana Stockgrowers Ass'n, the law is

inconsistent, and no definitive guidelines emerge as to when the court will
enforce the principle contained in a provision which is not self-executing.
III.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE SELF-EXECUTION

DOCTRINE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

A.

Historical Perspective and Lessons from Other Jurisdictions

State constitutional environmental protection is a clear response to
federal legislative and judicial failure to provide such protection.114 In
1970, Congress made two attempts to amend the federal constitution to
provide environmental protection." 5 Both amendments failed. Environ-

mentalists next turned to the federal judiciary. They unsuccessfully argued
that the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments implicitly encompass a
substantive due process right to environmental protection." 6 However,
107. "The legislature shall ... enact laws and provide appropriations to protect, enhance, and
develop all agriculture." MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 1, cl.1.
108. Montana Stockgrowers Ass'n, 777 P.2d at 288.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 290.
114. See Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, JudicialInterpretationofState ConstitutionalRights
to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 173, 175-79 (1993); Robert A. McLaren,
Comment, Environmental ProtectionBased on State ConstitutionalLaw: A Callfor Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REv. 123, 124-26 (1990).
115. S.J. Res. 169, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R.J. Res. 1321,90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
116. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1989); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Hawthorn Envtl. Preservation Ass'n v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. 1091, 1093,
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some courts have suggested that a federal right might exist under these

provisions in the future."' 7 One court stated, "Such claims, even under our
present Constitution, are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in one
way or another, obtain judicial recognition.' 118
State constitutional provisions enacted in response to the federal

legislative and judicial failure to afford protection include (1)statements
of public policy; 1 9 (2) statements of individual rights to a clean and

healthy environment; 20 and (3) statements incorporating the public trust
doctrine. 21 With few exceptions, courts have been reluctant to enforce the

constitutional mandates found in these provisions. 2 '
Courts generally hold that public policy statements are not selfexecuting, thus, these type of provisions offer little environmental protec-

tion.1 23 For example, Virginia has held that its public policy statement is
not self-executing. 124 In so holding, the court noted that the provision was
neither prohibitory nor negative in character, not included in the state bill
of rights, not declaratory of common law, and failed to lay down rules "by
means of which the principles which it posits may be given the force of
1095 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1977); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers of the U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
117. Stop H-3 Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 1430 n.21; Environmental Defense Fund,325 F. Supp. at 739.
118. Environmental Defense Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 739.
119. "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic
beauty ...... FLA. CoNsr. art. II, § 7.
120. "Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right
against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to
reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by law." IL.t_
Co.%s. art.
XI, § 2.
"All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and
healthful environment .... Mo.r. CONSr. art. II, § 3.
121. "Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people.
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people." PA. Coxsr. art. 1. § 27.
122. Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676-77 (Va. 1985); Kadillak v. Anaconda
Co., 602 P.2d 147, 153-54 (Mont. 1979); Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Envtl.
Sciences, 559 P.2d 1157,1161 (Mont. 1976); Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Nat'l Battlefield Tower.
Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 590-95 (Pa. 1973); but see State ex rel. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v.
Green, 739 P.2d 469,473 (Mont. 1987); Florida Power Corp. v. Gulf Ridge Council. 385 So. 2d 1155.
1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
123. See, e.g., Robb, 324 S.E.2d at 676-77.
124. Id. at 677.
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment for
recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources.its public
lands, its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall be the qommonwealth's policy to
protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.
VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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law." 125
12
Florida's constitution also contains a public policy statement.
While this provision may not be self-executing, Florida does acknowledge
the constitutional values contained therein. 27 For example, courts have
held that in condemnation proceedings, the condemnor must consider the
environmental and aesthetic damage that would accompany condemnation.12 8 Thus, at a minimum, state agencies must show that they balanced
the public interest in natural resource protection against further
development. 129
Illinois' constitution grants a right to a healthful environment and
includes a citizens' right to sue provision.' 3 0 A healthful environment is
"that quality of physical environment which a reasonable man would select
for himself were a free choice available .... "Is' By including the citizens'
right to sue clause, the provision eliminates the traditional "special injury"
requirement of standing.' 32 Parties may bring suit to prove a violation of
the right even though the wrong "may be a public wrong, or one common to
the public generally."' 133 The drafters are clear that the section creates no
new remedies. Traditional remedies of injunction and declaratory relief
are the only available remedies absent strict proof of economic or personal
34
injury.
Pennsylvania's constitutional amendment grants a right to a clean
135
and healthful environment, and purports to create a public trust.
Pennsylvania courts have developed a complete and extensive body of case
law interpreting and applying these environmental provisions.' 0 More-

125. Robb, 324 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting I COOLEY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 167-68 (8th
ed. 1927)).
126. "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic
beauty." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
127. See, e.g., Seadade Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1971);
Florida Power Corp., 385 So. 2d at 1156.
128. Florida Power Corp., 385 So. 2d at 1156-57.
129. Id.; Seadade Indus., 245 So. 2d at 214.
130. ILL. CONST. art. Xl, § 2.
131. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
132. Id.; see infra notes 216-41 and accompanying text.
133. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. CONST. art. Xl, § 2.
134. Id.; see infra notes 242-65 and accompanying text.
135. "The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the

Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people." PA. CONST. art. 1.
§ 27.
136. See, e.g., National.GettysburgBattlefieldTower, 311 A.2d 588; Snelling v. Department of
Transp., 366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976); Community College of Del. County v. Fox, 342 A.2d
468 (Pa. Commw. 1975); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), af'd, 361 A.2d 263
(Pa. 1976).
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over, Pennsylvania courts have examined the self-execution question as it
relates to the environmental provisions, but have never reached a consensus
on the issue.' 37
The court exhaustively examined self-execution in Commonwealth v.
National GettysburgBattlefield Tower, Inc.' 38 In that case, the Attorney
General brought suit on behalf of the citizens of Pennsylvania against a
party who contracted with the National Park Service to build an observation tower on a "[battlefield] setting which once was marked by the awful
conflict of a brothers' war."1 39 The Commonwealth argued that construction of the tower would violate each Pennsylvanian's right
to a clean and
1 40
healthful environment guaranteed by the constitution.
Two justices reasoned that if the constitutional right to a clean and
healthy environment existed alone, the provision might be self-executing.' 41 However, they concluded that the 14inclusion
of the public trust
2
doctrine eviscerated the guaranteed right.
This trust provision named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the
"trustee" of the state's public natural resources.14 3 The provision also gave
the state the power to "conserve and maintain [the resources] for the
benefit of all the people."' 44 These justices found no precedent for holding a
constitutional provision which tended to expand, rather than limit, the
exercise of governmental power as self-executing. 4 5
Moreover, the public trust provision did not provide the judiciary with
a "sufficient rule by means of which the right given might be enjoyed and
protected.1 46 These two justices reasoned that the executive branch of
government, through the attorney general, could not alone decide how and
when to enforce the principles contained in the provision. 4 7 Further, the
provision did not define the powers of the trustee, or the values the principle
purported to protect.'48 In addition, the provision did not establish
14 9
procedures by which private property could fairly be regulated.
In a concurring opinion, three justices expressed no opinion on the

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Payne, 312 A.2d at 94 n.2.
311 A.2d at 590-95.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 590.
Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.; PA. CONST. art 1,§ 27.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 592; PA. CossT. art .,§ 27.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 592.
Id. at 593-95; see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 593.
Id. at 593, 595.
Id. at 593.
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self-execution question, affirming the opinion on other grounds. 10 Two
justices dissented, concluding that the self-execution doctrine served only
to emasculate the constitutional provision at issue.' 5 ' They reasoned that
the provision was not addressed to the legislature, and that its meaning was
clear. 5 2 The drafters created a public trust: the res was the natural, scenic,
historic, and aesthetic values of the Commonwealth; the state was the
trustee; and the citizens of the Commonwealth were the trust beneficiaries. 153 The dissenting judges concluded that such a constitutional
device was enforceable in an equitable action.151
In a later case, a Pennsylvania Commonwealth court noted that no
majority was reached in the National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower case
and treated the provision as self-executing.' 55 After concluding that the
public natural resources of Pennsylvania had been constitutionally placed
in public trust, the Pennsylvania court devised a three-pronged test to
determine whether government action violated the constitutional environmental protection:
1. Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's
public natural resources?
2. Does the record indicate a reasonable effort to reduce the
environmental incursion to a minimum?
3. Does the environmental harm which will result from the
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to
be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?' 5 6
While such a test may appear sound on its face, it has nullified any
additional environmental protection offered by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Pennsylvania Constitution does not require "consideration of
factors beyond those which, by statute, must be considered in evaluating
projects which are potentially harmful to the environment.' 5 7 Indeed, a
Pennsylvania court may refuse to examine the second and third prongs of
the test if the state agency involved in making the challenged decision has
complied with all the applicable statutes. 58 Thus, Pennsylvania's constitutional protections appear to add nothing to existing statutory and regula-

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 595-96 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id. at 596 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 595 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Payne, 312 A.2d at 94 n.2, aft'd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
Id. at 94.
Snelling, 366 A.2d at 1305.
Community College of Del. County, 342 A.2d at 481.
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tory protections in that state.
B. Montana's Interpretation to Date
Montana courts have not definitively interpreted the environmental
protections found in the Montana Constitution. Moreover, the Montana
Supreme Court has not decided whether the Article II or Article IX
provisions are self-executing. To date, the Montana Supreme Court simply
construes the right to a clean and healthful environment' 59as legitimizing
the state's exercise of its police power.160 In State v. Bernhard,the court
reviewed the constitutionality of a regulation which required the shielding
of junk vehicles before the state would issue a license to maintain a motor
vehicle graveyard.16 1 The property owner, Bernhard, argued in part that
the regulation and the statute under which it was promulgated constituted
a taking of property without due process.162 The court concluded that the
crux of the pro se litigant's argument was that the shielding requirement
was without foundation, and could not properly support the state's exercise
of its police powers.' 63 The state argued that its police powers encompassed
aesthetic considerations, and the court agreed, relying in part on case law
from other jurisdictions and the constitutional right to a clean and healthy
environment:
Article II, Section 3 ... declares that the right to a "clean and

healthful environment" is an inalienable right of a citizen of this
state. Consistent with this statement... we hold that a legislative
purpose to preserve or enhance aesthetic values is a sufficient
basis for the state's exercise of its police power. ....
.

More recently, a defendant argued that as a property owner he
possessed an inalienable right to acquire junk vehicles on his property
without a license. 6 5 The 1987 Montana court disagreed, citing Bernhard
as dispositive.161 The court concluded that while a person does have a
constitutional right in Montana to acquire and possess real property, the
court must balance that right against competing rights, including the right
67
to a clean and healthy environment.1
Private parties attempting to constitutionally challenge state action
MONT. CONsT. art. 11, § 3.
160. See Green, 739 P.2d at 473; State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136. 138 (Mont. 1977).

159.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136.
Id. at 138.

Id.
Id.
Green, 739 P.2d at 473.
Id.
Id.
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have not fared as well as government agencies challenging private action.
The Montana Supreme Court has had two opportunities to define and

enforce the principles encompassed in the right to a clean and healthy
environment and the Article IX provisions.16 8 On each occasion, when

construing the Montana Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), 160 the
court concluded that MEPA's protective requirements must give way to
other statutory schemes.1 17
First, in Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,"' the Montana Supreme Court concluded that MEPA

did not displace two subdivision acts in which the legislature vested control
of subdivision planning in local government.17 As such, the Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences' (DHES) role in subdivision approval
was limited to review of water supply, sewage, and solid waste disposal.173
Given this limited role, the court concluded that the Environmental Impact

Statement (EIS) prepared by DHES was adequate, and that DHES need
not consider in its EIS the myriad of factors and alternatives enumerated
under MEPA.' 74
Justice Haswell filed a vigorous dissent in which he set out the original
decision "from which [the court] ....made a 180 degree turn."1 75 That
withdrawn opinion is illustrative because it defines the right to a clean and

healthy environment. In its original opinion, the court concluded that the
right was a civil right, existing "on a parity" with other more traditional,
168. Kadillak, 602 P.2d at 147; Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 559 P.2d 1157.
169. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -324 (1993).
170. MEPA requires all state agencies to examine the environmental consequences of any
proposed major state action capable of significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
MONT. CODEANN. § 75-1-201 (1)(b). The state agency must address (1)the environmental impact of
the proposed state action; (2) adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposed action take place; (3) alternatives to the proposed action; (4) the relationship between local
short-term uses of man's environment; (5) the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and (6) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented. Id.
171. 559 P.2d 1157 (Mont. 1976).
172. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 559 P.2d at 1161.
173. Id. Plaintiffs challenged DHES' approval of water and sewer systems for a subdivision
infringing on wildlife habitat. Id. at 1158. Plaintiffs argued that the EIS prepared by DHES was
inadequate because the agency did not disclose whether it used a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach in drafting the EIS. Id. at 1159. Further, plaintiffs argued that the EIS was inadequate
because DHES did not include (I) a detailed statement of alternatives to the development; (2) a
detailed statement of the relationship between short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; (3) a detailed statement of the environmental impact of the proposed subdivision; and (4) consideration of the full range of the economic and
environmental costs and benefits of the alternative actions available. Id.
174. Id.; see supra note 170 for an outline of MEPA requirements.
175. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 559 P.2d at 1161-1177 (Haswell, J., dissenting). The court
issued the opinion reprinted by Justice Haswell, but on rehearing, withdrew it and issued a new opinion.
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inalienable rights. 76 Moreover, the court concluded that the right to a
clean and healthy environment was a fundamental right. 7,
In a later case, Kadillak v. Anaconda Co.,'7 8 the court considered the
statutory interaction of MEPA with the Hard Rock Mining Act
(HRMA).7 9 In that case, the Anaconda Company filed an application
with the DSL to secure an operating permit for mining activities in close
proximity to a subdivision in Butte. 8 0 The permit would have allowed the
company to construct "a mountainous waste dump of overburden and
discard from open pit mining operations" within 200 hundred feet of the
subdivision.18" The Commissioner of State Lands considered the issuance
82
of the permit to be a major state action requiring an EIS under MEPA.1
An EIS was prepared, on the basis of which the Commissioner issued a
permit. 8 3 The plaintiff homeowners challenged the adequacy of the EIS
and the validity of the permit.''
The court agreed that Anaconda Company's activities constituted
"activity capable of significantly affecting the human environment.'1 8 5
However, the court found that MEPA conflicted with the HRMA which,
at that time, mandated the DSL to automatically issue a permit if it had not
acted within sixty days. "Given that the 60 day period is a woefully
inadequate period for the preparation of a proper EIS,"' 88 the court
concluded that the MEPA and HRMA were in conflict. The court framed
the issue
as whether MEPA authorized an extension of HRMA's time
limits. 187
The court looked to the federal interpretation of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 88 for guidance. The court reviewed
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Flint Ridge Development Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n,'8 9 which held that NEPA must give way in cases of
statutory conflict.' 90 Based upon this interpretation, the Montana Su-

176. Id. at 1167 (Haswell, J.,dissenting).
177. Id. at 1168 (Haswell, J. dissenting).
178. 602 P.2d 147 (Mont. 1979).
179. MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4-301 to -362 (1993).
180. Kadillak, 602 P.2d at 150.
181. Id. at 151.
182. Id. at 150.
183. Id. at 150-51.
184. Id. at 151.
185. Id. at 152.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 153.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. 1111993).
189. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
190. FlintRidge Dev.,426 U.S. at 788. "Not even the policies of NEPA,which areof the utmost
importance to the survival of our environment, can rewrite section 201 (b) to undermine the property
rights of prospecting permittee lease applicants." Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., v.
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preme Court reasoned that NEPA and MEPA were similar, and, following
the federal interpretation, held that MEPA must give way to more specific
statutory schemes when there is an "unavoidable and irreconcilable"
conflict. 191
Plaintiffs argued that the Article II right to a clean and healthy
environment together with the protections contained in Article IX provided, in essence, independent state grounds for departing from the federal
interpretation of NEPA.' 9 2 Justice Haswell, ironically, rejected this
argument, reasoning that the legislature did not enact MEPA to supplement the right to a clean and healthy environment because MEPA
predated the constitution. 93 Justice Haswell concluded that "the statutory
requirement of an EIS is not given constitutional status by the subsequent
enactment of [the] constitutional guarantee."'""
IV.

AN APPROPRIATE THEORY OF SELF-EXECUTION

The self-execution doctrine, largely an instrument of judicial restraint, 9 5 allows the legislature to effectively overturn an organic document and subvert fundamental law by simply failing to legislate in a given
area. "The declarations of constitutions are placed therein to be obeyed,
and are not to be 'frittered away by construction.' "1 Before addressing
the self-execution doctrine anew, a Montana court should revisit the
judiciary's role in a constitutional democracy.
Interpreting the constitution is exclusively a judicial function.19 7 By
awaiting legislative action to enforce a constitutional duty, or define a
right, the court allows other branches of government to function in
disregard of fundamental law. If the court allows the legislature to assume
such a role, "we no longer have a system of democracy in a republic of three
equally balanced departments of government.' 9
The constitution is either a superior paramount law unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then

Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (referring to the Fed. Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
1976, 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1975)).
191. Kadillak, 602 P.2d at 153.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 154.
194. Id.
195. 'Fernandez, supra note 53, at 382-84.
196. Alexander v. State, 381 P.2d 780, 782 (Mont. 1963) (quoting McElroy v. Kansas City, 21
F. 257 (1884)).
197. Allstate Insurance Co. v. City of Billings, 780 P.2d 186, 188 (Mont. 1989).
198. Jones v. Burns, 357 P.2d 22, 39 (Mont. 1960) (Bottomly, J., dissenting).
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a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on
the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.1 99
A state constitution is a compact between the citizenry and its
government. Courts should construe these compacts as meaningful,
positive law since a constitution is "the mandate of a sovereign people to its
servants and representatives."2 0 Therefore, courts should generally effectuate all principles found in a constitution. 0
Constitutional provisions can essentially be divided into three types:
(1) broad public policy statements; (2) general principles; and (3) clearly
detailed rules. Detailed rules will seldom, if ever, face a self-execution
challenge. 02 However, the lines are blurred with regard to public policy
2 03
statements and more general principles.
To be an effective check and balance against the legislature, courts
must take cognizance of each constitutional principle. If the constitutional
provision includes only general principles, for example, clauses which are
mandatory, but not prohibitory, or if a constitutional provision is a detailed
rule, such as mandatory-prohibitions, the court has a constitutional duty to
apply the principle embodied in the constitution so long as the principle is
applicable to the case before it.
When reviewing mandatory-nonprohibitory provisions, the court is
obligated to apply and enforce these general principles to the greatest
extent possible even though the legislature has yet to amplify and explain
the principles with legislation. For example, a Montana court should not
wait for the legislature to define the right to a clean and healthy
environment.
The Montana Supreme Court has already laid the foundation for an
appropriate- interpretation of that right. Having held that the right is an
inalienable right, 04 and that the right exists "on a parity" with other
199. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
200. General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859.862 (Mont. 1975) (quoting 16 Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 56).
201. Id. (quoting 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw §§ 14-16). "The wordsofa constitution may not

be ignored as meaningless .....

Id.

202. Detailed rules are most analogous to mandatory-prohibitory provisions. See supra notes
60-66 and accompanying text.

203. General principles are most analogous to the mandatory- nonprohibitory provisions
discussed supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. Broad public policy statements arc most
analogous to the non-mandatory, non-prohibitory classification discussed supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
204. State exrel. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469.473 (Mont. 1987);
State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977),
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rights,2"' the court should not hesitate to establish an appropriate balancing test when the right comes into conflict with other rights, such as the
right to acquire and possess real property, 0° or when the right conflicts
with the public interest in resource development. The Montana Supreme
Court should use Bernhard and Green as an appropriate foundation to
expound on this constitutional right.2" '
When construing the legislative directives accompanying the
mandatory, nonprohibitory duties to maintain and improve the environment, and to reclaim all lands disturbed by the taking of natural
resources,20 8 the Montana court should follow the precedent of General
Agriculture Corp.2"' In such instances, the right or duty should be
protected or enforced to the greatest extent possible, although supplemental legislation might better aid or protect the right, or enforce the duty.
In such cases, the court should narrowly tailor its holding, resolving
the dispute before it in the context of the particular facts of the case as
presented. The legislature is the more appropriate branch to give detailed
meaning to these general principles. Hopefully, legislative detail will
answer a broad range of prospective problems and hypothetical questions
which the judiciary can use to resolve future cases.
Insofar as any legislative explanation and amplification is compatible
with the constitutional principle, the court should look to the applicable
legislation when construing constitutional provisions of general principle.
However, if legislation conflicts with a constitutional provision, the court
must strike the legislation as unconstitutional.
Moreover, if the Montana Supreme Court again faces conflict
between MEPA and another statutory scheme, the court should revisit its
holding in Kadillak.1 0 At a minimum, such conflicts should be resolved in
favor of MEPA based on adequate, independent state grounds in the
Montana Constitution. Generally, courts should continue to hold that
public policy statements are not self-executing. However, courts should
review legislative enactments closely to see if they comport with the values
found in the public policy statement. Butte Community Union provides the
Montana court with precedent for such review. 21 ' Indeed, if the electorate
has given a value constitutional status, the court may be justified in
scrutinizing under a higher standard legislative action affecting that

205.
206.
207.

Green, 739 P.2d at 473.
Id.
See supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.
208. MONT. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2.
209. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
211. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Mont. 1987); see supra notes 94104 and accompanying text.
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value.2 12 In the context of statements of environmental public policy,
213
Florida jurisprudence serves as an appropriate model.
V. SOME PROBLEMS GENERATED BY SELF-EXECUTING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

A. Standing
Environmental plaintiffs still face certain obstacles after clearing the

self-execution hurdle. Given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,214 standing may be the largest and
highest.

215

Standing is a mechanism whereby the court assures that the plaintiff
has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. '216

Standing derives from notions of judicial restraint, as well as from the case
or controversy requirement in the U.S. Constitution. 1 Montana interprets the "cases in law or equity" clause in the Montana Constitution 21 a as
embodying the same requirements as the federal case or controversy

requirement. 219 Generally, a plaintiff must show that he or she
has personally been injured or threatened with immediate injury
by the alleged constitutional or statutory violation. Before [the
court] can find a statute to be unconstitutional, "the party who
assails it must show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that
he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in 22some
indefinite way in common with people
' 0
generally.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that injury is not confined to
economic injury, but includes aesthetic and environmental harm.221 In a
dissenting opinion, former Chief Justice Haswell of the Montana Supreme
212. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
213. See. e.g., Florida Power Corp. v.Gulf Ridge Council, 385 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
214. 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
215. See generallyGene R. Nichol, Jr.,JusticeScalia.Standing, and Public Law Litigation. 42
Duke L.J. 1141 (1993).
216. Olson v. Department of Revenue, 726 P.2d 1162. 1166 (Mont. 1986) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
217. Olson, 726 P.2d at 1166; U.S. CoxsT. art. 111, § 2.
218. "The district court has original jurisdiction in... cases at law and equity." Mo,-r. Co.sr.
art. VII, § 4, cl.1.
219. Olson, 726 P.2d at 1166.
220. Id. (quoting Chovanak v. Matthews, 188 P.2d 582, 585 (Mont. 1948)).
221. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
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Court argued that environmental harm is a cognizable injury, and offered a
three-pronged test to determine if an environmental group has standing to
sue a state agency. 2 2 Justice Haswell concluded that an environmental
plaintiff has standing if it can show:
(1) past, present or threatened injury to a property or civil right;
(2) the injury is distinguishable from the injury to the public
generally, but need not be exclusive to the plaintiff; and
(3) the issue presents a case or controversy within the judicial
223
cognizance of the state sovereignty.
Justice Haswell reasoned that the right to a clean and healthy
environment was a civil right, as well as a fundamental and inalienable
right, and environmental degradation was within judicial cognizance. 2 4
Moreover, the dissent concluded that an environmental group's injury is
distinguishable from the general public's if it uses the public lands adjacent
22 5
to the site of the challenged action.
Not only were these standards articulated in a dissenting opinion, but
they predate Defenders of Wildlife. Thus, environmental plaintiffs should
be prepared to meet the harsher standing test set out in Defenders2 of
1
Wildlife. First, an environmental plaintiff must show an injury in fact.
An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest, and the injury
2 7
must be concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent.
Presumably, the right to a clean and healthy environment is a legally
protected interest. However, "particularized" will preclude many plaintiffs, especially environmental groups, who cannot make a strong showing
that their injury is distinguishable from injury to the public. 2 28 Further, a
court could interpret "actual or imminent" as something more than a mere
"threat" of injury.229
Second, plaintiffs must show a causal connection, fairly traceable to
the defendant, between the injury and the challenged action. 230 Finally,

222. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Bd. of Health and Envtl. Sciences, 559 P.2d 1157, 1167
(Mont. 1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1167.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1168.
226. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
227. Id.
228. [T~he injury in fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured .... [Defenders of
Wildlife must] submit affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only
that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that
one or more of [its] members would thereby be "directly" affected apartfromtheir "special
interest" in thlel subject.
Id. at 2137-38 (emphasis added) (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 735, 739).
229. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138 n.2.
230. Id. at 2136.
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plaintiffs must show that a favorable decision
is "likely, as opposed to
231
injury.
the
redress
to
speculative,"
merely
Environmental plaintiffs may shoulder a lesser burden under one
exception in Montana standing jurisprudence. If the general public is
intended to benefit by a constitutional provision which has been "the victim
232
of legislative strangulation," any registered voter has standing to sue.
This exception has successfully been invoked in a least one Article IX
challenge. In Butte-Silver Bow Local Government v. State,33 plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that the Resource Indemnity Trust Act
(RITA)2 34 violated the constitutional duty to reclaim all lands disturbed by
the taking of natural resources.235 Several individuals sued in their
individual capacity as registered voters and taxpayers alleging that they
would suffer serious adverse impacts to their environmental and aesthetic
well-being if proper reclamation in the city of Butte, Montana, did not
23 6

occur.

The court concluded that these individual citizens indeed had standing to sue. The court reasoned that the individual plaintiffs had standing as
registered voters because the constitutional duty to reclaim lands was
enacted for the public benefit.237 The court further reasoned that the
legislature was strangleholding the principle of reclamation by enacting
the RITA, which allows funds to be expended for programs and projects
other than reclamation.238
In addition, the individual plaintiffs had standing to sue as taxpayers.
The court reasoned that a taxpayer has standing "to question the validity of
a tax, or the expenditure of the tax monies, provided the issue(s) presented
directly affect the constitutional validity to collect239or use the proceeds of
the tax by the state" or local government unit.
Thus, environmental plaintiffs face strong standing challenges under
the U.S. Constitution. Likewise, given Montana's incorporation of federal
standing requirements through the "cases in law or equity" clause,
environmental plaintiffs may have few independent state grounds to
deviate from federal standing jurisprudence. Nevertheless, some windows
of opportunity remain through the public interest exceptions defined in
Butte Silver-Bow Local Government.

231.
232.

Id.
Committee for an Effective Judiciary v. State, 679 P.2d 1223. 1225 (Mont. 1984).

233. 768 P.2d 327 (Mont. 1989).
234. MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-101 to -203 (1993).
235. Butte-Silver Bow, 768 P.2d at 328.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 329.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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Remedies

The Montana Constitution purports to open the courts to every
person.240 However, the Montana Supreme Court has held that the state
constitution only guarantees a right of access to seek a remedy recognized
by common law.2 ' The Montana Constitution does not guarantee a
fundamental right to full legal redress.242 Further, a party does not have
a
24 3
vested right in a particular common law cause of action or rule.
The legislature may also require a plaintiff to exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing a complaint.244 Thus, the legislature
may effectively curtail the environmental protections found in the constitution by enacting "reasonable procedural requirements. 2 45 These requirements need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.246 Environmental plaintiffs should be prepared to argue for a higher
level of scrutiny2 47 since the Montana Supreme Court has stated
the right
248
to a clean and healthy environment is an inalienable right.
Once a court takes judicial cognizance of a constitutional environmental claim, an environmental plaintiff should be prepared to argue for a
particular remedy. For an environmental plaintiff bringing a cause of
action under Article IX, there is little chance for securing a political
remedy, e.g., requesting the court to compel the legislature to enact
legislation to enforce the duty to maintain a clean and healthful environment, or enacting reclamation standards which fulfill the constitutionally
contemplated standard. "[I]t is too well settled to need any citation of
authority that the judiciary cannot
compel the Legislature to exercise a
' 2' 49
purely legislative prerogative.
However, if the legislature refuses to act, environmental plaintiffs
might successfully argue for a structural injunction remedy similar to that
which civil rights plaintiffs secured in the school segregation cases 250or the
Arkansas prison cases.251 Courts seem to design such a remedy when the
240. "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every
injury of person, property, or character." MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 16.
241. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491-92 (Mont. 1989).
242. Id. at 493.
243. Id. at 493-94.
244. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chance, 797 P.2d 200, 206 (Mont. 1990).
245. Id,
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Mont. 1987); but see
Montana Stockgrowers Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 777 P.2d 285, 288 (Mont. 1989).
248. State ex rel. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469,473 (Mont. 1987);
State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977).
249. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972).
250. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
251. See, e.g.. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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legislature has refused to take action. The right to a clean and healthy
environment, when construed with the Article IX legislative mandates,
provides the court with some legitimizing grounds to assume a legislative
cloak.
We think it is appropriate to observe here that one of the
exceptions to the separation-of-powers doctrine is in the area of
constitutionally guaranteed or protected rights. The judiciary is
in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the
Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a
meaningless instrument without some responsible agency of
government having authority to enforce it ....
When the people
have spoken through their organic law concerning their basic
rights, it is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide
the ways and means of enforcing such rights; however, in the
absence of appropriatelegislative
action, it is the responsibility
25 2
of the courts to do so.
Further, while a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel an administrative
agency, or similar body, to perform a discretionary duty, 253 environmental
plaintiffs could successfully secure such a writ if "there has been such 2an5
abuse of discretion as to amount to no exercise of discretion at all."1'
Environmental plaintiffs may also argue for a direct cause of action
for damages under the state constitution. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics255 the U.S. Supreme
Court allowed a direct cause of action for damages against agents, who
under color of federal authority, made a warrantless entry into the
plaintiff's premises. The court ruled that such a cause of action was
available when "no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress" exist. 256 Later cases clarify that the
existence of comprehensive procedural and substantive statutory or
administrative mechanisms which give meaningful relief will bar a cause of
action under the Constitution.257
States have followed Bivens and its progeny, allowing direct constitutional actions.2 55 Moreover, some courts have held that the doctrine of
252. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 269 So. 2d at 686 (emphasis added).
"253. Reep v. Board of County Comm'rs of Missoula County. 622 P.2d 685. 688 (Mont. 1981).
254. Id. at 687-88.

255. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
256. Bivens. 403 U.S. at 396.
257. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,422-23 (1988); Bush v.Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,388-90
(1983).
258. Corum v. University of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992); Fenton v. Groveland
Community Services Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1982).
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sovereign immunity must give way to the supremacy of the constitution .2 51
Nevertheless, special factors may counsel against a constitutional claim
for money damages based on the environmental provisions in the Montana

Constitution.
Foremost, such provisions were enacted to protect the resources of the
state, and a citizens' right to sue amendment was specifically rejected.2 00

As a matter of public policy, the court must consider the litigation increase
which would occur by allowing direct constitutional claims. When fashioning a remedy for violations of the constitutional protections, the Montana
Supreme Court would do well to follow the North Carolina's court
reasoning in Corum v. University of North Carolina."1
Any remedy fashioned should "bow to established claims and reme-

dies where these provide an alternative to inherent constitutional authority," and remedies should "minimize encroachment on other branches of

government by seeking the least intrusive means. 216 Looking at Illinois'
reasoning, injunctive and declaratory remedies seem adequate in all
instances except in cases where the plaintiff presents clear and convincing

proof of economic or personal injury.263
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court will inevitably face the opportunity to
give meaning to the environmental provisions in the state constitution. The
court should be prepared to protect the right to a clean and healthful
environment, 6 4 enforce the duty to maintain a clean and healthy environment, 6 5 and ensure proper reclamation of disturbed lands. 266
The court should continue to construe the right to a clean and
healthful environment as an inalienable right existing on a parity with
other historical rights, such as the right to possess real property. 6 7 The

259. It would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the one hand that citizens have
constitutional individual civil rights that are protected from encroachment actions by the
State, while on the other hand saying that individuals whose constitutional rights have been
violated by the State cannot sue because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291; see also Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 763; Alexander v. State, 381 P.2d 780,
782 (Mont. 1963). But see Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Haw. 1980) (distinguishing
between claims against state officials and claims directly against the state).
260. See C. Louise Cross, The Battle for the Environmental Provisions in Montana's 1972
Constitution, 51 MONT. LAw REV. 449, 452-55 (1990).
261. 413 S.E.2d 276.
262. Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 291.
263. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
264. MONT. CONST. art. If, § 3.
265. MONT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1, cl.
1.
266. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl.1.
267. Green, 739 P.2d at 473; Bernhard, 568 P.2d at 138.
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court should protect this right by balancing the right against competing
rights and interests.2 68
When enforcing the duty to maintain a healthful environment, in the
absence of clarifying legislation, the court should enforce the duty, but
narrowly tailor its holding to the facts before it. 26'9 Further, the court
should ensure that state reclamation standards meet a constitutionally
acceptable level. If legislative and regulatory reclamation standards fail to
meet the requisite level, the court must strike those standards2 10 Finally, if
applicable, the court should view the environmental provisions of the state
constitution as providing independent state grounds for departure from
federal court interpretations of environmentally protective statutory and
regulatory schemes.17 ' Under no circumstances should the court adopt the
protective cloak of the self-execution doctrine to escape publicly tumultuous and unsettled environmental issues. To do so would subvert the
fundamental law as declared by Montanans, as well as deny protection to
the "quiet beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness
of our rolling plains .... "2 In the words of Judge Honzel, the
constitutional provisions at issue here are not merely advisory. They mean
something.

268. Green, 739 P.2d at 473.
269. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
270. See. e.g., Butte Community Union,745 P.2d at 1130-33 (striking legislation failing to meet
constitutional standard of providing economic assistance to the aged, infirm and misfortunate).
271. See supra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
272. MONT. CONST. Preamble.

